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Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation on the
United Kingdom Continental Shelf in the Aftermath
of the Macondo Disaster
John Paterson
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 2010 Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, the United
Kingdom’s approach to the regulation of offshore occupational health and
safety, on the one hand, and to environmental protection, on the other, had
evolved considerably over its forty-five year history. In regard to health
and safety, an essentially self-regulatory approach gave way to detailed
prescriptive regulation. This transformation occurred in response to the
Sea Gem disaster in 1965, but it was subsequently supplanted by the
current goal-setting and safety case regime established in the aftermath of
the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster. Concurrently, driven in no small measure
by the United Kingdom’s international—especially European—
obligations, environmental regulation had expanded, to the point that, by
2010, every aspect of offshore operations was subject to multiple pieces
of environmental legislation. In many respects, it was unforeseeable that
an accident occurring in another jurisdiction, especially one governed by
different regulatory approaches, would have produced any significant
impact on the United Kingdom’s arrangements.
Nevertheless, the Macondo disaster’s effects on the British regulatory
scheme continue to be felt in the United Kingdom some five years after
the accident. Significantly, however, the most important of these effects
have not come directly to the United Kingdom, but rather were transmitted
via the European Union. Furthermore, the latest developments are
impacting the United Kingdom’s offshore occupational health and safety
regime, which had previously been relatively self-contained in comparison
to that of the European Union, where regulation of the offshore industry
was principally tied to environmental regulation. The question, therefore,
arises as to whether such change is wholly coherent with the existing
British system, or whether it introduces a potentially destabilizing
inconsistency. In other words, have the institutions of the European Union
unnecessarily complicated the United Kingdom’s arrangements with their
attempts to minimize the risks of a Macondo-style disaster in European
waters? Conversely, where the European Union has followed the United
Copyright 2016, by JOHN PATERSON.
 University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom
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Kingdom’s approach to intervention, has it inadvertently compelled wider
adoption among other Member States of a regulatory approach that
remains questionable in many aspects?
Answering these already complex inquiries requires consideration of
two other issues that have arisen since 2010. The first questions the
influence of other institutional reforms underway in the United Kingdom
as a result of the previous regime’s concern over the effects of the United
Kingdom Continental Shelf’s (UKCS) maturity as a hydrocarbon
province, specifically related to the maximum economic recovery of oil
and gas. The second raises the more current issue of the significant
reduction in the price of oil and the expectation that the recent levels—
even as of the summer of 2014—will not be achieved again in the
foreseeable future.
Part I of this article considers the United Kingdom’s own postMacondo parliamentary and independent reviews of its regulatory regime
for occupational health and safety and environmental protection. Part II
moves on to assess the European Union’s interventions. Conclusions are
then drawn, suggesting that while the United Kingdom’s regulatory
arrangements will not likely be threatened by the actions of the European
Union, the transposing of United Kingdom models on other less developed
regions of the OCS could prove problematic.
I. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S REVIEW OF ITS HEALTH, SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
The scale of the Macondo disaster, both in terms of lives lost and in
terms of the amount of oil spilled, could not be easily ignored by any state
involved in offshore oil and gas production. Thus, even if the United
Kingdom felt that it had relatively advanced and sophisticated regimes for
the regulation of occupational health and safety and the regulation of
environmental protection, it nevertheless had no interest in appearing
complacent or suggesting that there were no lessons to learn from such an
unprecedented event. In any case, the fact that the United States had
already announced a moratorium on deepwater drilling—and the
European Union Commissioner for Energy had called on Member States
to do the same—made it imperative that the United Kingdom either follow
suit or demonstrate clearly that such action was unnecessary.
The Parliamentary Select Committee for Energy and Climate Change
(Select Committee) announced an inquiry on July 20, 2010, “to examine
the safety and environmental regulations of oil and gas operations on the
UKCS—especially in the deepwater to be found in the region West of
Shetland—and the potential positive and negative impacts of a
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moratorium on deepwater drilling.”1 The Select Committee sought
evidence on, inter alia, “the extent to which the existing British safety and
environmental regulatory regime is fit for purpose.”2 The implicated
government departments and agencies—the Department of Energy and
Climate Change (DECC), the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), and the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)—converged to deliver a unified
response to this call. They took a position that attempted to strike a
balance—on the one hand claiming that “[o]ur regulatory regime is
already among the most robust in the world and the industry’s track record
in the North Sea is strong,” whilst on the other acknowledging that “we
must learn everything we can from the Macondo well.”3 The
Memorandum submitted by the three bodies set out their respective roles
and responsibilities as they were established following the Piper Alpha
disaster in July 1988, when 167 men were killed in the destruction caused
by an explosion and fire on a major North Sea production platform. The
HSE was responsible for assessing and regulating “the integrity and safety
of offshore installations in the [United Kingdom]” under the Health and
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, particularly the goal- setting and safety case
regulations which were introduced following the inquiry into the disaster,
led by Lord Cullen, a senior Scottish judge.4 DECC was responsible for
licensing and environmental regulation offshore, which included the duty
to approve Oil Pollution Emergency Plans. The MCA was responsible, “if
required, for deploying any counter pollution measures to minimise a
pollution incident.”5 The Memorandum noted that a variety of
international initiatives designed to learn the lessons of Macondo were
already under way, and, while it outlined the United Kingdom’s
engagement with all of these, it also stressed the need to ensure that any
proposed changes:

1. PARLIAMENTARY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE—SECOND REPORT, UK DEEPWATER DRILLING—IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL, 2010-11, H.C. 450-I, 1 [hereinafter SELECT
COMMITTEE REPORT].
2. Id. at 2.
3. MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE, HEALTH & SAFETY EXECUTIVE, AND MARITIME AND
COASTGUARD AGENCY, 6 January 2011, 4 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM].
4. LORD CULLEN, THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE PIPER ALPHA DISASTER
Cm. 1310 1990) [hereinafter CULLEN REPORT].
5. MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 9–11.
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are based on robust evidence; are proportionate and risk
assessment based; avoid disruption to existing mature regulatory
regimes (such as the UK’s) that have proven to be effective over
time; and do not lead to any reduction in national safety
requirements by setting lower international standards.6
The specificity of the United Kingdom’s approach, in particular to
health and safety regulation, must be understood in order to grasp the
precise significance of those enumerated concerns. On the
recommendation of an inquiry made into the 1965 Sea Gem disaster, the
United Kingdom had shifted from a relatively light-touch and essentially
self-regulatory approach to one characterized by detailed prescriptive
rules.7 The difficulty involved in producing this level of detail for a
technologically complex and evolving industry soon became apparent,8
but the United Kingdom stuck to the task even as it abandoned a similar
approach to onshore industries.9 The United Kingdom launched another
inquiry to report on the fitness of its own regulatory regime in the
aftermath of the Ekofisk blowout—which occurred in the Norwegian
sector of the North Sea in 1977—but missed the opportunity to remedy
this problem.10 With the benefit of hindsight, the folly of the United
Kingdom’s approach in the 1970s and 1980s appears all too evident, but
it took the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 to lay bare the extent to which the
detailed prescriptive regulatory regime had become detached from the
reality of operations on the UKCS. With DECC’s predecessor, the
Department of Energy,11 being criticized for failing to conduct meaningful
inspections,12 and the operator, Occidental, being criticized for having a
superficial attitude to risk mitigation,13 it came as no surprise that Lord
Cullen’s inquiry recommended sweeping changes. In addition, Lord

6. Id. at 25.
7. MINISTRY OF POWER, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE
ACCIDENT TO THE DRILLING RIG SEA GEM, 1967, Cmnd. 3409.
8. It took four years from the publication of the Sea Gem inquiry report to
pass framework legislation in the form of the Mineral Workings (Offshore
Installations) Act 1971. The full set of regulations under the Act was not in place
until 1980. Not insignificantly, the last of these were the Offshore Installations
(Well Control) Regulations 1980 (SI 1980/1759).
9. GREAT BRITAIN COMMITTEE ON SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK, SAFETY
AND HEALTH AT WORK: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, 1972, Cmnd. 5034 (U.K.).
10. BURGOYNE COMMITTEE, OFFSHORE SAFETY: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE,
1980, Cmnd. 7866 (U.K.).
11. Note that at this time the Department of Energy had responsibility not only
for licensing and environmental regulation but also for health and safety offshore.
12. CULLEN REPORT, supra note 4, at para. 15.48–50.
13. Id. at ch. 14.

2016]

HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

263

Cullen’s skepticism regarding the prescriptive regulatory approach14 and
his findings on the inadequacies of the industry’s much-vaunted
emergency response arrangements,15 and the case for wholesale change
became compelling. The inquiry’s recommendations, accepted in full by
the government of the day,16 resulted in the transfer of responsibility for
health and safety offshore from the industry’s sponsoring department to
the dedicated HSE.17 The United Kingdom abandoned the prescriptive
regulatory approach in favor of a goal-setting approach more in tune with
the reforms made in other industries during the 1970s.18 This shift assigned
the operator, as the creator and manager of risk, the responsibilities of
identifying the hazards affecting his or her specific installation, assessing
the related risks, and finally specifying the measures necessary to
minimize and mitigate those risks. This process would be formally set out
in a document—the safety case—for each installation, making the case to
the regulator that the design, construction, and operation of the installation
were safe.19 Significantly, the workforce would also be involved in the
preparation of the safety case. The regulator—the HSE—would then either
accept this case or seek modifications until satisfied. Furthermore, the
safety case itself would exist as a “living document,” which would be
updated on an ongoing basis to reflect the changing set of hazards
confronting the installation and the consequent impact on the risk
assessment and, by extension, on the range of risk minimization and
mitigation measures required. Lord Cullen insisted that it was impossible
to legislate safety,20 and the extent to which this new regime adopted that
belief is abundantly clear: the onus was no longer on the state to develop
detailed regulations that guaranteed safe operations contingent on
compliance. Rather, the onus fell on the individual operator to develop an

14. Id. at para. 21.51, para. 21.42.
15. Id. at para. 9.49–57. See also BURGOYNE COMMITTEE, supra note 10 at
Submission 43, para. 5.3.
16. For the parliamentary debate, see 180 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1990)
329–345; 187 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1991) 472–576.
17. Offshore Safety Act 1992.
18. Offshore Installations (Management and Administration) Regulations,
1995, SI 1995/738; Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response) Regulations, 1995, SI 1995/743; Offshore Installations and
Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations, 1996, SI 1996/913; Pipelines
Safety Regulations, 1996, SI 1996/825; Diving at Work Regulations, 1997, SI
1997/2776; and Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations, 1998, SI
1998/2307.
19. Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 1992, SI 2885/1992,
replaced by Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 2005, SI 3117/2005.
20. CULLEN REPORT, supra note 4, at para. 21.4.
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approach to operations on his or her installation that would ensure the
safety of the workforce and of the installation itself.
Therefore, the concerns expressed by the United Kingdom’s
regulatory authorities in the evidence they presented to the Select
Committee can be clearly understood as a warning against any knee-jerk
reaction to the Macondo disaster that ran contrary to the lessons the nation
had already learned, not least in relation to a regulatory approach avoiding
as far as possible prescriptive “solutions” handed down by the government
and placing the key responsibility for hazard identification, risk
assessment, and risk minimization and mitigation on operators. The net
effect of the United Kingdom’s approach in this regard would require any
authority acting in such a prescriptive way to be certain the “solution”
imposed fits with the existing safety case for each installation, without
thereby creating hazards or increasing risks as a consequence of its
interaction with existing specific environmental or infrastructural issues.
Confirmation that this concern was key in the minds of the United
Kingdom’s responsible regulatory bodies may be inferred from the
conclusions drawn in the Memorandum in relation to the likelihood that
the sequence of events leading up to the Macondo disaster could have
occurred on the UKCS under the regulatory regime outlined above.
Insofar as the United States had resisted any temptation to follow the
United Kingdom and other developed jurisdictions down the road towards
a risk-based approach to the regulation of health and safety offshore—
away from detailed prescription—and had persisted with a regulator, the
Minerals Management Service, that performed multiple (potentially
conflicting) functions in relation to licensing, revenue collection, and
safety and environmental regulation, the conclusions reached by the
United Kingdom’s authorities are perhaps unsurprising:
[T]he Government believes the UK has a rigorous offshore oil and
gas safety regime, with significant differences in the type and style
of the legislative requirements and the regulatory/enforcement
approach compared with the USA. The UK offshore oil and gas
industry also has a somewhat different safety culture than that in
the Gulf of Mexico. Here, there is greater workforce engagement
in safety issues, which is supported by regulatory requirements.
Whilst it is impossible to say that such a blowout as occurred with
the Deepwater Horizon could never happen in UK waters, our
additional and different layers of regulatory protection provides a
reduced probability that it would.21
21. MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at para. 46.
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Nor was the Select Committee itself unpersuaded by this conclusion.
It opined that “the UK [United Kingdom] has high offshore regulatory
standards, as exemplified by the Safety Case Regime,” and that the United
Kingdom’s framework “is based on flexible, goal-setting principles that
are superior to those under which the Deepwater Horizon operated.”22
Nevertheless, indications that the Select Committee was not entirely
convinced by evidence from the industry regarding the implementation of
the regulatory regime persist. Among its conclusions, the Select
Committee also noted its concern “that the offshore oil and gas industry is
responding to disasters, rather than anticipating worst-case scenarios and
planning for high-consequence, low-probability events.”23
The seriousness of this problem as identified by the Select Committee is
perhaps not immediately apparent, but it is submitted that, if this finding is
correct, it would in fact represent a profound questioning of the United
Kingdom’s post-Piper Alpha approach to health and safety regulation
offshore. Indeed, it could be concluded that the regime does not actually
achieve what is claimed for it. Insofar as a safety case is genuinely a living
document representing the operator’s understanding at any given time of the
hazards confronting his or her installation, the assessment of the risk, and an
account of the risk minimization and mitigation measures, then it would surely
be impossible for the industry to have adopted a reactive stance rather than an
anticipatory one. If such a profound questioning of the goal-setting and safety
case approach is possible, does this indicate that the rejection of the
prescriptive approach in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster was perhaps
too hasty? Before any answer to this question is attempted, it is necessary to
consider in greater detail the nature of the approach to environmental
regulation that was subject to review by the Select Committee and current on
the UKCS at the time of the Macondo disaster.
While the Macondo disaster could be seen in the first instance as a
failure of safety regulation, the focus thereafter is very much centered on
its environmental effects. Whereas the United Kingdom’s safety regime
had been developed substantially in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha
disaster, the focus in that case on the very considerable loss of life meant
that little consideration was paid to environmental regulation at that time.
As mentioned, the environmental regulation of the industry on the UKCS
derives in no small measure from European Union legislation and the
range of activities subject to environmental protection regulations is very
wide indeed. From concern over acoustic disturbances of marine mammals
stemming from seismic surveys during exploration, to the need to comply
with a range of provisions relating to atmospheric emissions during
22. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at para. 3.
23. Id. at para. 4.
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operations, to the regulation of well abandonment at decommissioning—
every stage of the lifecycle of a hydrocarbon project requires compliance
with dozens, if not hundreds, of pages of regulations.24
While the Select Committee did devote time to environmental
regulation, its focus markedly emphasized the safety dimension. By
contrast, the independent review (Maitland Review) of the regulatory
regime for offshore oil and gas conducted at the request of the Secretary
of State for Energy and Climate Change had more to say in this regard.25
In particular, the Maitland Review noted:
Much of the UK’s offshore environmental regulation regime is
concerned with preventing or minimising any leakage of
hydrocarbons during normal operations, and is strongly governed
by EU regulation in this area. Consequently it is relatively
prescriptive compared to the safety regime, with less scope or
encouragement for operator initiatives to innovate or be proactive.26
Accordingly, the Maitland Review explicitly criticized the general
European Union approach to environmental regulation, insofar as its
prescriptive nature limits the ability of the operator to identify the best
solution to hazards and risks affecting the individual installation. That
observation thus implicitly endorsed the goal-setting and safety case
approach, which is supposed to have the virtues of ensuring that
responsibility lies with the creator of risk and providing a framework to
achieve ongoing hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk
minimization and mitigation.
It might, therefore, be concluded that the Select Committee’s concerns
regarding the safety case approach should not lead blindly back to readoption of a prescriptive approach. On the other hand, the Maitland
Review made clear that the review panel shared the Select Committee’s
concerns about the safety case approach, noting that although it viewed
that regime “as, on the whole, robust and effective at identifying risks and
24. A good impression of the range and complexity of regulation applying to
offshore hydrocarbon operations may be gained from the environmental
legislation database maintained by Oil and Gas UK. See Legislation Index, OIL &
GAS UK, http://oilandgasukenvironmentallegislation.co.uk/legislation-index.htm
[perma.cc/7ES8-RVH7] (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
25. A panel chaired by Professor Geoffrey Maitland conducted the review.
Geoffrey Maitland, Offshore Oil and Gas in the UK: an independent review of the
regulatory regime, December 2011, at 4, available at https://www.gov.uk
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48252/3875-offshoreoil-gas-uk-ind-rev.pdf (hereinafter Maitland Review).
26. Id.
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appropriate measures for mitigation and response, it [had] some concerns
about the processes for confidently assuring that these plans are reliably
and effectively implemented.”27
The United Kingdom’s own assessment of its health, safety, and
environmental regulations at the time of Macondo might, therefore, be
summarized as follows. Prescription in relation to health and safety has
been abandoned and no compelling reason appears to justify a return to it.
Prescription in relation to environmental protection may suffer from the
same problems that previously beset this approach to safety, but, insofar
as the United Kingdom is bound by European legislation that is
characterized by this approach, little room remains for maneuver. The
preference for the goal-setting and safety case approach should not,
however, be read as blind faith that this regulatory orientation is inevitably
superior, since its success depends upon the extent to which it is
appropriately implemented; evidence of problems in this regard persist.
This most recent finding by the Select Committee in 2010 and by the
Maitland Review in 2011 are all the more troubling, as they essentially
confirm problems identified by the HSE in 2007,28 which should, in
essence, have been resolved by 2009.29
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERVENTION
If these were the problems confronting the United Kingdom as a
mature hydrocarbon province, they were nothing compared to those facing
the European Union’s institutions. Prior to the Macondo disaster, those
bodies had not displayed a particular interest in the upstream industry
beyond the application of general environmental and health and safety law,
as well as a somewhat more direct, but still light, involvement in the
industry’s health and safety through the Extractive Industries Directive.30
However, following the Macondo disaster, the interest of European Union
institutions in the offshore industry increased significantly. Both the

27. Id.
28. HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, KEY PROGRAMME 3: ASSET INTEGRITY
PROGRAMME: A REPORT OF THE OFFSHORE DIVISION OF THE HSE’S HAZARDOUS
INSTALLATIONS DIRECTORATE, 2007-8.
29. HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, KEY PROGRAMME 3: ASSET INTEGRITY
PROGRAMME: A REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRY’S PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE OFFSHORE
DIVISION OF THE HSE’S HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS DIRECTORATE, 2009-10.
30. Council Directive 92/91/EEC concerning the minimum requirements for
improving the safety and health protection of workers in the mineral-extracting
industries through drilling, 1992 O.J. L 348/9.
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European Parliament31 and the European Commission (Commission)32
indicated in October 2010 that legislative action was necessary at the
Union level. Initially the suggestion contemplated restricting such action
to the amendment of the Extractive Industries Directive, but the eventual
proposal from the Commission contemplated a new regulation.33
Publication of the proposed regulation provoked consternation in the
United Kingdom—the largest oil producer in the European Union.34 The
concern flowed from the fact that the approach to health and safety
regulation contained in the document was perceived to run counter to that
adopted in the United Kingdom, despite the pains taken by the
Commission to suggest that it had drawn inspiration from the best
practices evident in the United Kingdom and other producing Member
States. The apprehension was all the more acute in the United Kingdom
and other experienced producer states because, under European Union
law, a regulation has direct effect without the need for any transposition
into domestic law and supersedes contrary Member State law. Member
States saw this intervention as particularly heavy-handed and feared that
it might undo years of lessons that were often learned the hard way.
The strength of the reaction against the proposal, as well as the number
of identified problems suggesting a lack of understanding of the industry,
may have persuaded the Commission that legislating by way of a directive
would be more appropriate. In contrast to a regulation, a directive under
European Union law requires action from the Member States to implement
its requirements through domestic law. A directive also offers Member
States more freedom of action, with the emphasis being on the
achievement of the overall objective rather than on the means of
achievement. Therefore, industry leaders and regulators in countries such
as the United Kingdom greeted the replacement of the proposed regulation
with a draft directive with some relief. A close reading of the eventual
Offshore Safety Directive (OSD)35 suggests, however, that the impact will
31. EU action on oil exploration and extraction in Europe, 2011 O.J. C 371E/03.
32. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: Facing the challenge of the safety of
offshore oil and gas activities, SEC (2010) 1193 final, 12 October 2010.
33. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production
activities, COM (2011) 688 final, 27 October 2011.
34. Norway also objected strongly to the proposal. Though not a member of
the EU, it would be affected by the Regulation through its membership in the
European Economic Area, as the Commission was of the view that this legislation
had significance for the EEA.
35. Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive
2004/35/EC Text with EEA relevance, 2013 O.J. L 178/66.
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still be significant, especially in terms of regulatory architecture. Thus, the
Commission’s concern in eliminating conflicts of interest between
economic development on the one hand, and health, safety, and
environmental regulation on the other,36 meant that DECC could not retain
both its licensing and environmental regulatory responsibilities.
This requirement in the OSD could have posed a tricky problem for the
United Kingdom had it not been for the fortuitous intervention of Sir Ian
Wood’s Review (Wood Review), published in early 2014 and dealing with
the maximization of the economic recovery of hydrocarbons.37 The
incumbent-Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change commissioned
the review, soliciting from Wood—a respected member of the oil and gas
industry—his views on which reforms of the United Kingdom’s licensing and
regulatory regime were necessary to ensure, as the country entered the late
stages of maturity as a hydrocarbon province, that as much of its oil and gas
resources as possible would be extracted before cessation of production.
Among his recommendations, Wood proposed that the licensing function
currently performed by DECC should be taken over by a new independent,
arm’s-length regulator with novel and enhanced powers to direct the industry
and to overcome commercial behaviors that, though in the interest of
individual licensees and their co-venturers, were not conducive to maximizing
the economic recovery of the nation’s hydrocarbon resources. Acceptance of
these recommendations led to the formation of the Oil and Gas Authority
(OGA),38 which will assume the licensing duties currently borne by DECC.
The net effect of this change eliminates the potential conflict of interest within
DECC between licensing and environmental regulation. As will be seen in
due course, however, it is still unknown whether this apparently neutral
institutional change will raise issues of relevance for health, safety, and the
environment.
A further complication arises from the fact that the OSD calls for
health, safety, and environmental risks to be considered together. Whereas
the United Kingdom, after the Piper Alpha disaster, moved to separate the
regulation of health and safety from the licensing function, the regulation
of environmental protection was not similarly affected. Therefore, while
the safety case focuses on the identification of hazards affecting health and
safety, thereafter seeking to quantify risks to health and safety and
detailing the employment of measures to reduce those risks to a level as
low as reasonably practicable, the equivalent document in the OSD—the
36. Id. at Article 8(2).
37. SIR IAN WOOD, UKCS MAXIMISING ECONOMIC RECOVERY REVIEW:
FINAL REPORT (2014).
38. See Infrastructure Act, (2015), § 7, 41–48 (U.K.). A further bill, which
will detail the new regulator’s powers, is expected at the time publication.
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Major Hazard Report—calls for simultaneous consideration of health and
safety hazards and environmental hazards, followed by appropriate risk
assessment and management. These requirements, transposed into British law
by new regulations,39 replace the existing Safety Case Regulations of 2005.
While operators may find it relatively straightforward to adapt to the
new approach—not least because many oil companies already unify
health, safety and environmental functions within one department—the
question arises as to how the review and acceptance of the new safety case
will be achieved at the level of the regulator, since the HSE claims no
expertise in environmental matters and DECC claims none in relation to
health and safety. The OSD itself provides only that a competent authority
will perform the role and leaves open the possibility that more than one
regulatory body comprise that authority. The United Kingdom’s approach
in this regard has been to create a specific regulator responsible for the
implementation of the OSD, the Offshore Safety Directive Regulator
(OSDR), which is “a partnership between HSE’s Energy Division and
DECC’s Offshore Oil and Gas Environment and Decommissioning
Team.”40 This administrative scheme is of course, possible, because of the
transfer of licensing functions away from DECC to the OGA. The OSDR
stresses that the two bodies, DECC and HSE, “already work closely
together under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for liaison
between the two organizations and their regimes,” though it also
acknowledges that “existing arrangements need to be expanded to comply
with the requirements of the [OSD].”41 Given that DECC and the HSE
have collaborated successfully onshore in relation to the implementation
of European Union legislation relating to the control of major accident
hazards (COMAH),42 there is surely every reason to be optimistic that the
new arrangement offshore will not give rise to any undue complications,
and it may indeed produce a more integrated appraisal of health, safety
and environmental hazards and risks.
39. The Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.)
Regulations,2015, 2015, S.I. 2015/398 (U.K.).
40. For details, see Health and Safety Executive, Offshore Safety Directive
Regulator, http://www.hse.gov.uk/osdr/index.htm [perma.cc/9CV5-QMHX] (last
visited Dec. 14, 2015).
41. See Health and Safety Executive, OSDR – The Competent Authority, http:
//www.hse.gov.uk/osdr/authority.htm [perma.cc/9FAC-V8E6] (last visited Dec. 14,
2015).
42. The European Union’s Directives as to COMAH are often referred to as
the “Seveso Directives”. See The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations
2015, 2015, S.I. 2015/483 (U.K.). For details of the HSE’s cooperation with
environmental regulators in this regard, see The COMAH Competent Authority,
HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/authority.htm
[perma.cc/Q4TR-3UZ2](last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
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CONCLUSION
This article opened with two questions relating to the impact of the
European Union’s intervention in the regulation of health and safety and
environmental protection in the offshore oil and gas industry in the
aftermath of the Macondo disaster. First, in attempting to ensure that the
risks of a Macondo-style disaster in the waters of the European Union are
minimized, have that organization’s institutions unnecessarily
complicated the United Kingdom’s arrangements? Second, where the
European Union’s intervention has followed the United Kingdom’s
existing approach, has it inadvertently compelled the wider adoption
among Member States of an approach to regulation about which questions
may legitimately be raised?
Given the extent to which the Commission’s initial proposals were
modified in the face of significant criticism, and given that the key impact
on regulatory architecture in the United Kingdom has been to bring DECC
and the HSE together as the OSDR, in a manner substantially mirroring
their existing COMAH cooperation, good reasons surely support
answering the first question in the negative. Of course, it is worth bearing
in mind that this solution was only made possible by the fortuitous
establishment of the OGA and the transfer to it of DECC’s licensing
function. What would have happened should the Wood Review not have
occurred, or should Wood have come up with different recommendations
in relation to licensing, remains an open question?
The second question is not so easy to answer. Certainly substantial
grounds exist supporting the widespread view in the United Kingdom that
its goal-setting and safety case regime does indeed constitute best practice
and offers, in principle, significant advantages over a detailed prescriptive
approach to regulation. Accordingly, very good reasons justify the
conclusion that the adoption of this approach throughout the European
Union should be welcomed and that Member States who may be in an
earlier phase of offshore development—(of which there are a number in
the Mediterranean and Black Seas)—will therefore benefit from the
experience gained by countries such as the United Kingdom. On the other
hand, the nagging questions about the extent to which the safety case, as a
paper exercise, reflects and/or affects physical operations remain. These
questions were previously raised by the HSE in 2007 and, despite
reassurances that they had been addressed in 2009, their re-emergence in
the conclusions of both the Select Committee Review and the Maitland
Review in 2010 and 2011, respectively, is striking. Is there a risk, then,
that the Commission, in compelling the European Union-wide adoption of
this approach, has thereby spread not best practice, but rather a practice
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that, despite its advantages over prescriptive regulation, appears to contain
a weakness that has not yet been convincingly addressed?
If that risk does indeed exist, then it is surely one that will only be
exacerbated by the current low price environment that has seen the
industry, as in previous downturns, cutting costs aggressively. While the
safety case should, as a living document, prevent cost-cutting that
increases safety risks, the HSE’s 2007 findings suggest that this effect did
not occur during earlier low price situations. If this scenario poses
potential problems for any state with an offshore industry, it does so all
the more for the United Kingdom, which, fifty years after the award of its
first license, now sees much of its offshore infrastructure characterized as
“aging assets.” With the advent of the new (and newly-empowered)
regulator through the OGA, the circumstances potentially place operators
at the center of a maelstrom of competing pressures. From one direction,
the operators may face pressures to cease production and decommission
due to the maturity of the reservoir and the low price environment. From
another, they may see unprecedented demands from the OGA to retain
infrastructure and collaborate with other joint ventures—and invest
accordingly—in the wider interests of the state, irrespective of what their
individual commercial decision might have been. From yet another
direction, operators may face pressures from the OSDR either to invest to
ensure ongoing safe and clean operation or to decommission aging assets.
Thus, the energy trilemma between energy security, economic
development and environmental protection, though a macro-level global
problem, thus also exists in an acute form at the micro-level of individual
offshore installations in a mature hydrocarbon province such as the UKCS.
The European Union’s interventions were no doubt well intentioned, and
they may have many benign effects. One nevertheless may wonder
whether, in reacting to the specific circumstances of the Macondo disaster,
the European Union missed the opportunity to resolve the problem that
could have had the greatest impact on ensuring that offshore oil and gas
operations would be safe and clean in the most complex situations,
including those characterized by competing political, economic, and
environmental pressures. This goal could perhaps be better served by
focusing attention not on the widespread deployment of the safety case
approach, but rather on ensuring that, once deployed, implementation
occurs in such a way as to actually reflect and affect physical operations.43
43. This point was made by the author in the May 20, 2011 submission produced
by a Working Group of the IBA’s Oil and Gas Committee and Environment, Health,
and Safety Law Committee in response to the European Commission’s Public
Consultation on Offshore Safety launched on March 16, 2011.

